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COMMENTS
BINDING INSURANCE RECEIPTS: RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES ARISING THEREUNDER
In the field of insurance law there are many conflicts as to the rights and
liabilities of the insurer and the applicant. The conflict is especially acute where
the agent issues to the applicant a binding receipt which ostensibly insures him
prior to the delivery of the policy. Whether or not the beneficiary is legally
entitled to payment if the applicant dies between the issuance of the binder
and the delivery of the policy depends upon many diverse factors.
An application for insurance is an offer by the applicant to allow the company
to insure him.' As a general rule no contract with the insurance company comes
into existence until the company has accepted the application. 2 As in any contract the intent of the parties is usually controlling, and all conditions precedent
must be complied with before the contract becomes a binding obligation. The
applicant may revoke his offer at any time before it has been accepted, 4 and
if he does so the insurance company loses the money expended in investigating
him and in giving him a medical examination. 5 In order to avoid the potential
loss of such expenditures, insurance companies sometimes issue a binding receipt
in return for the payment of the first premium when the application is signed"
which amount will usually offset the investigation and examination expenses if
the applicant revokes his offer. In some instances the applicant is entitled to the
return of his first premium if he withdraws his application, but the amount
involved is normally too small to make litigation feasible. 7 Moreover, to preclude
even the possibility of a suit to recover the premium, some binders state that
the applicant
agrees to forfeit the amount of the first premium if he revokes his
8
application.
While the applicant becomes protected at some time prior to delivery of the
policy, 9 it cannot be said that he is always protected during the entire period
between the issuance of the binding receipt and the final approval of his application.' 0 Whether or not he is insured from the time the binder is issued depends
1. Couch, Insurance § 84 (1929).
2. Schultz & Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 304 N.Y. 143, 106 N.E.2d 273 (1952); More
v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 537, 29 N.E. 757 (1892) ; Goldberg v. Colonial
Life Ins. Co., 284 App. Div. 678, 134 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1954). See also Mulligan,
Does War Excuse The Payment Of Life Insurance Premiums?, 17 Fordham L. Rev. 63, 69
(1948).

3. "Where an application contains a condition precedent, that condition must be performed before the application can ripen into an agreement, binding on the parties. . ....
Richards, Insurance § 386 (5th ed. 1952). Often the contract is conditioned on delivery of
the policy. Couch, Insurance § 93 (1929).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 1223 (1935).
6. Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 180 (1938).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Ibid.
9. Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 523 (1954).
10. See note 6 supra.
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on the type of binder used, the language of the binder itself 11 and to what extent
the court will impinge on strict contract law in order to protect the beneficiaryY"
Binding receipts fall into two classes, "satisfaction" and "approval." Under
the first type, the "satisfaction" type binder,13 coverage becomes effective immediately if the applicant is in fact then an insurable risk, subject to being
terminated if the company refuses to accept the application because it does not
consider him an insurable risk. 14 This form of binder does not give rise to much
litigation when the applicant dies between the time the binder is issued and the
time the company acts on the application. All that the beneficiary need show
in order to recover is that the applicant was in fact an insurable risk,25 and that
the company had not notified the applicant that his application had been
rejected.16 On the other hand, under the "approval" type binder-, the applicant
is not covered until his application is approved by the home office of the insurance company. However, when approval is given, the coverage becomes effective
as of the date of issuance of the binder.' 8
Ta EXSTING CONFLICT
A serious conflict exists in the application of the law pertaining to approval
binding receipts.' 9 The incongruity of case law arises because courts differ as to
how strictly the offer-acceptance principle of contract law should be enforced^0
11. Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 187, 2S3 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dzp't
1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 663, 8 N.E.2d 338 (1937).
12. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom Of Contract, 43
Colum. L.Rev. 629 (1943); 2 A.L.R.2d 1019 (1943).
13. A typical satisfaction type binder reads in part as follows: "Provided the insured be
in sound health ... on the date of said application, the company's liability ... fhall commence as of the date of said application." See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Valei
213 Ind.601, 602, 12 N.E.2d 350, 352 (1933).
14. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E2d 350 (1938);
Reynolds v. Northwestern Alut. Life Ins. Co., 1S9 Iowa 76, 176 N.W. 207 (1920) ; Comment,
44 Yale L.J. 1223 (1935). Fear that the applicant will not be able to pay premiums, or the
existence of an epidemic are not grounds for refusal by the company to honor the binder.
15. This can usually be shown by the examining physician's report to the company.
16. Comment, 63 Yale LJ.523 (1954).
17. A typical approval type binder reads in part as follovs: " ... the insurance shall
take effect from the date of the application ... provided said application is approved and
accepted at the Home Office... " See Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co., 243 App. Div. 187,
188, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661, 662 (2d Dep't 1936).
18. See Comment, 44 Yale LJ. 1223 (1935).
19. In Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy, 324 Pa. 97, 187 At. 403 (1936), it was
said that since the exact terms of the binding receipt vary, no case can be a binding precedent
for any other. Each case must be decided by ascertaining the intention of the parties.
20. In speaking of the conflict of authority on this subject it has been stated that,
.. . the existing conflict actually is a reflection of the differences of opinion entertained
by the courts as to the extent to which social interest in the freedom of contract and in
the security of transactions entered into should be permitted to be outweighed by the interest
of society to protect, in a case where the parties to a contract have unequal bargaining power,
the one party who, because of his inferior bargaining strength, must either accept what is
offered or be deprived of the advantages of the relation, against unduly oppres-sive or exces.
sive conditions forced upon him by the party superior in bargaining power." 2 A.L.R. 2d
1019 (1948).
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when its enforcement will result in inequity and hardship to one of the parties.21 22
One of the earliest cases on the subject was Insurance Co. v. Young's Adm'r,
in which judgment for defendant insurance company was granted on the ground
that there was no acceptance of the applicant's offer. In this case a binder was
issued, but the company rejected the application by making a counter offer to the
applicant before his death. Little fault can be found with the rule of this case
when it is limited to its facts. However the case has sometimes been erroneously
interpreted as standing for the the proposition that the company always has the
right to reject the application after the death of the applicant.23
A slightly different problem arises when the company has neither approved
nor rejected the application when the applicant dies. The weight of authority
denies recovery upon the ground that since the company has not approved the
24
application, there has been no acceptance of the offer, and thus no contract.
Recovery has also been denied where the company has approved the application
subsequent to and in ignorance of the applicant's death, on the theory that the
subject matter of the contract, i.e., the applicant's life, has gone out of existence, 25 and that there is no offeror with whom to contract.
On the other hand, there have been cases where courts have granted recovery
under various theories. Sometimes the court will ignore the condition of approval,
2
rule that the binder is ambiguous, and therefore construe it against the insurer.
21. " . . . [FIreedom of contract must mean different things for different types of contracts. Its meaning must change with the social importance of the type of contract and with
the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract." Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom Of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev.
629, 642 (1943). But see Hughes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 Misc. 31, 35, 297
N.Y. Supp. 116, 122 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1937) where the court, in ruling that there was no
acceptance of the applicant's offer, said: "A contrary interpretation of the language of the
receipt would violate the elementary principles of the freedom of contractual rights."
22. 90 U.S. (23 Wall) 85 (1874). Accord, Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed.
81 (8th Cir. 1902).
23. Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934); Brancato v. National
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 35 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1929); Beaty v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 29
S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See also Havigburst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts,
33 I1. L. Rev. 180 (1938).
24. Steinle v. New York Life. Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489 (5th Cir. 1897); Cooksey v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 73 Ark. 117, 83 S.W. 317 (1904); Northeastern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus,
145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 (1911); Corning v. Prudential Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 187, 289
N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 668, 8 N.E.2d 338 (1937).
25. Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934). Cf. Starr v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905), where the court ruled that the offer died
with the death of the applicant, but granted recovery on the ground that the parties Intended
temporary insurance.
26. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849 (1947); Hart v. Travellers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp. 711
(2d Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1933). " . . . [Ilnsurers who seek to
impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft,
must bear the burden of any resulting confusion." Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., supra at 602.
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Under another theory recovery
is granted on the ground that any other finding
27
would be unconscionable.
Some cases have used a different approach in order to circumvent the necessity
for actual approval by the company of the application. These decisions permitted
recovery on the basis that the parties intended a temporary contract of insurance,28 as in the case of satisfaction binders. In Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,the agent of the company gave the applicant an approval binder in exchange for
payment of the first premium, and the home office approved the application a
few hours after the death of the applicant. The court admitted that the offer
died with the death of the applicant, but ruled that, while the application and
binder must be construed together, where they conflict the binder must pre-ail.
The court found that the binder showed that the applicant and the agent intended
interim insurance to be in effect until the application was either approved or rejected. The court also held that the agent's lack of actual authority to enter into
such a contract was immaterial since the applicant was unaware of such lack
of authority 0 In Albers v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co.,3 the court implied an

intention to grant interim insurance from the fact that the company antedated
the policy to the date of the binder, and also that the applicant would not have
intended to pay for something he was not getting 2

In National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Moorc,3 3 which involved an approval

type binder, the company approved the application after the death of the
applicant. Recovery was granted, the court holding: "If the application was
approved at the home office . . . then under the terms of the premium receipt

the insurance became effective from the date of such receipt. . . . This would
be true, although the applicant died before the application was approved, since
the insurance became effective from the date of the receipt and not from the date
of approval of the application."34 This statement is in direct conflict with the
established rule of law that whether or not the contract exists must be determined
at the moment of the applicant's death. Once the applicant dies, the subject
matter of the alleged contract goes out of existence, and any subsequent
acceptance of the offer is ineffectual. 35
27. "It would be unconscionable to permit an insurance company, issuing such a receipt
and receiving a premium from an applicant, part of which was to pay for protection under
its policy from the date of the application to the date of acceptance, to say that it had not
bound itself to give anything whatever for that portion of the premium.... " Wetern &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 611, 12 N.E2d 350, 354 (1938); see alo Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 26 (concurring opinion).
28. Halle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. 740, 58 S.W. 822 (1900); Albers v. Security
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170 N.W. 159 (1918); Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41
Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
29. 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).

30. Accord, Halle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. 740, 58 S.W. 822 (1900).
31.

41 S.D. 270, 170 N.W. 159 (1918).

32. "By the payment of the premium for one year an insured is entitled to insurance for
one year." Albers v. Security Mlut. Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 275, 170 N.W. 159, 160 (1918).
33. 83 Ga. App. 2S9, 63 S.E.2d 447 (1951).
34. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Moore, 83 Ga. App. 289, 291, 63 S.E2d 447,
449 (1951).
35. Braman v. Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934).
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It is virtually impossible to reconcile all of the conflicting decisions of the
various courts in this country. Where a satisfaction binder is involved, the beneficiary will recover if he can show that the applicant was an insurable risk, and
that the company had not
notified the applicant before his death of its refusal
30
to accept his application.
Where an approval binder is involved, an attempt to predict the outcome of
any given case is usually mere speculation. 37 If the applicant is in fact an insurable risk, certain courts may grant recovery on the ground of ambiguity
or inequity.38 This is not an ideal solution since an insurance company that acts
in good faith can never be sure that it will be protected from such a finding.
In jurisdictions where the courts find that the parties intended an interim
coverage,3 9 the company can protect itself to some extent by stating in the application and in the binder that its agent has no authority to make any verbal
contract with the applicant. This would be notice to the latter, and should prevent the court from finding apparent authority. However, this would not
necessarily preclude the court from holding that the company itself impliedly
agreed to temporary coverage, since otherwise the applicant wouldn't have
received that for which he had bargained.
On the other hand, the applicant is at distinct disadvantage where the courts
strictly enforce the offer-acceptance principle, 40 an approach to the problem
which has one inherent weakness. The application leads to a contract when the
company accepts the offer and promises to pay a certain amount upon the death
of the applicant. Such contract can come into existence without the issuance of
a binding receipt and the prepayment of the first premium. Thus it is natural
to conclude that the binder and the first premium, given in consideration of each
other, form a contract distinct from the one which will later mature if the company accepts the application. What benefit does the applicant receive in return
for the payment of the first premium? We cannot assume that the binder is
merely a worthless scrap of paper. Viewing the problem from this approach,
we are almost forced to conclude that a contract came into being, providing
temporary insurance until the company accepts or rejects the application.
The only other possible answer to the question of what benefit the applicant
receives in return for prepayment of the first premium was discussed in Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.41 The company argued that the applicant
received six benefits other than immediate coverage: "(1) The policy would
sooner become incontestable. (2) It would earlier reach maturity, with a corresponding acceleration of dividends and cash surrender. (3) It would cover
the period after 'approval' and before 'issue'. (4) If the insured became uninsurable between 'completion' and 'approval' it would still cover the risk. (5) If
the insured's birthday was between 'completion' and 'approval', the premium
would be computed at a lower rate. (6) When the policy covers disability, the
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 523 (1954).
See note 19 supra.
See notes 26, 27 supra.
Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).

40. See note 24 supra.
41.

160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
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coverage dates from 'completion'.1 4- The court rejected this argument on
the ground that the applicant contemplated immediate coverage and granted
recovery on the ground of ambiguity.

Thus we have seen some of the theories under which courts either grant or deny
recovery. The obvious uncertainties found in the language of many courts and
their zealous attempts to distinguish cases when no distinction actually exists,
would lead an observer to believe that the conflict is a social one rather than
one of law.4 3 The disharmony becomes even more apparent when we observe
how the decisions conflict even within one state such as New York.
STATE OF THE LAW IN NEW Yonx

The law of New York pertaining to approval binding receipts is far from
clear.4 A leading case is Hart v. Travellers Ins. Co.,s in which the applicant
died on the day following the insurance of a binding receipt and payment of the
first remium. The binder read in part as follows:
"First. If the money for which this receipt has been given is sufficient to pay
in full the first premium
this receipt. ....

such insurance shall be in force from the date of

"Second. The Company shall have the right to disapprove such application
and shall incur no liability thereunder until and unless received and approved
by the Company at the Home Office. .. .
The trial court held that there was no contract since the company never
approved the application. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with the
plaintiff's contention that the true meaning of the receipt was that the applicant
was insured from the date of the receipt until either a policy was issued or the
company declined to issue such policy. The binder expressly stated that the insurance would be in force as of the date of the binder if the first premium was
paid. This would obviously lead the insured to believe that he was covered
immediately. It wasn't the applicant's intention to pay for something that he
wasn't getting, i.e., full coverage from the date of the binder. To circumvent
the provision requiring approval, the court stated that the receipt was ambiguous
and must be construed against the company since it was filled out by its agent
on a form printed by the company. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Shortly thereafter, in Buow v. PrudentialIns. Co4 7 the Appellate Division,
in a memorandum decision, reversed a judgment for the company, on the
42. Id. at 601. The word "completion" refers to the completion of the application. Thus

subdivision four is meaningless since the company would not approve the application if it
became aware of the fact that the applicant had become uninsurable subsequent to completion of the application.
43. See note 20 supra.

44. "The law of New York is in doubt." Gaunt v. John Hancock lut. Life Ins. Co.,
160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
45. 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563, 185
N.E. 739 (1933).
46. 236 App. Div. at 311, 258 N.Y. Supp. at 712.

47. 240 App. Div. 898, 267 N.Y. Supp. 972 (2d Dep't 1933).
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authority of the Hart case. In a subsequent case,48 this court in attempting
to distinguish the Buono case from the case at bar stated that it granted a new
trial in the former because the length of time that the company held the application without either accepting or rejecting it raised a question of fact
as to whether or not it had waived the provision relating to approval.
Four years after its decision in the Hart case the Appellate Division, upon
similar facts, rendered a contrary decision in Corning v. PrudentialIns. Co.49 The
binder in this case read in part as follows: " .. . if the above payment is equal
to the full first premium* on said policy (and not otherwise), the insurance shall
take effect from the date of the application, in accordance with the provisions
of the policy applied for, provided said application is approved and accepted
at the Home Office. . . . ,,o The application was rejected by the company
which sent to the applicant a different policy requiring payment of a higher
premium, but the applicant died before receiving the counter offer. At the trial
both parties moved for judgment, and the court granted plaintiff's motion on the
authority of the Hart and Buono cases. The Appellate Division reversed and
granted the company's motion for judgment.
The court attempted to distinguish the Hart case on the language used in the
binder, and seemed to place great emphasis on the fact that the statement that
coverage would take effect immediately and the condition of approval appeared
in different subdivisions. 51 In speaking of the binder in the case at bar, the court
held that " . . .the language of the receipt in the one sentence dealing with
the taking effect of the insurance, fortified by similar language in the application,
makes it plain that approval by the company is a prerequisite. 5' 2 Once again
the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
The next case to arise in New York was Arcuri v. Prudential Ins. Co.,53 in
which the home office of the company received, but neither approved nor rejected
the application. The trial court found for plaintiff, but the Appellate Division
reversed and dismissed the complaint. The latter court cited with approval the
Corning case and quoted extensively from it. This might be looked upon as an
48. Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 187, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't
1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 668, 8 N.E.2d 338 (1937).
49. 248 App. Div. 187, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 668, 8 N.E.2d
338 (1937).
50. 248 App. Div. at 188, 288 N.Y. Supp. at 662. The asterisk called the reader's attention to a note at the bottom of the receipt which requested the applicant to notify the company if he failed to receive either the policy or a refund of the premium within six weeks.
51.

In speaking of the binder in the Hart case the court said: " . . . the receipt con-

tained a number of so-called terms and conditions, the first of which was a clear and
unconditional statement that upon payment in full of the first premium the insurance shall
be in force from the date of the receipt. Subsequent terms, under different subdivisions,
were not reconcilable with this expression at the outset and thus created an ambiguity."
248 App. Div. at 190, 228 N.Y. Supp. at 664.
52. 248 App. Div. at 190, 288 N.Y. Supp. at 664.
53. 248 App. Div. 501, 290 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1936). In this case the binder
provided that " . . . the insurance shall take effect from the date of this application ...
provided this application is approved and accepted at the Home Office ....
" 248 App.

Div. at 502, 290 N.Y. Supp. at 568.
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extension of the Corning decision, since in that case there was a rejection and
counter offer before the applicant died, whereas in the Arcuri case the company
took no action at all on the application. The Corning and Arcuri cases were
followed in Hughes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,G4 wherein the Appellate
Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The last in this series of cases
was Speronza v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 15 in which the Appellate Division
reversed a finding for defendant, and ruled that there was a question of fact as to
whether or not the company, by failing to either accept or reject the application,
had waived the condition of approval.
As we have seen, there are six cases which represent the law of New York
on the subject of approval binders. In three of them, recovery was denied on the
ground that there was no acceptance of the applicant's offer. 0 In the other three
a finding for the company was reversed, once on the ground of ambiguity,*7 and
twice upon the ground that whether or not the company had waived, by its
inaction, the condition of approval was a question of fact. 5 The uncertainty
of the courts as to the true state of the law becomes even .. ore apparent when
we observe that in five of the six cases, the finding of the trial court was
reversed.59 In order to resolve the problem it becomes necessary to distinguish
the Hart and Corning cases if any distinction exists, because these are the leading
authorities, having been affirmed, albeit without opinion, by the Court of Appeals.
Ambiguity, while possibly not the soundest legal approach to the problemca
must be considered as a ground for recovery by the beneficiary in New York.
This is so not only because of the opinion in the Hart case, but also because
of the great lengths to which the same court went in the Corning case in an
attempt to distinguish the two cases. The court in the Corning case ostensibly
agreed with the decision by saying that: "If the condition of approval is buried
beneath a mass of misleading verbiage, its ambiguity must be decided in favor
of the applicant." 6' The court then agreed that there was an ambiguity in the
Hart case, seemingly basing this interpretation on the fact that the condition
54. 254 App. Div. 570, 3 N.Y.S.2d S99 (2d Dep't 193S).
55. 272 App. Div. 770, 69 N.Y.S.2d 397 (2d Dep't 1947).
56. Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co., 24S App. Div. 187, 2SS N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't
1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 668, S N.E.2d 333 (1937); Hughes v. John Hancock Aut. Life Ins.
Co., 254 App. Div. 570, 3 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2d Dep't 193); Arcuri v. Prudential Ins. Co., 243
App. Div. 501, 290 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1936).
57. Hart v. Travellers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't 1932),
aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1933).
58. Speronza v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 770, 69 N.Y.S.2d 397 (2d
Dep't 1947); Buono v. Prudential Ins. Co., 240 App. Div. 898, 267 N.Y. Supp. 972 (2d
Dep't 1933).
59. Only in the Hughes case was the decision of the trial court upheld on appeal.
60. In urging that recovery be granted on the ground of inequity, rather than that of

ambiguity, the concurring opinion in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F2d
599, 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. S49 (1947), stated: "Hence a result placed not

squarely upon inequity, but upon interpretation, seems sure to produce continuing uncertainty in the law of insurance contracts."
61. Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co., 24S App. Div. 137, 190, 235 N.Y. Supp. 661, 6M4
(2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 668, 8 N.E.2d 338 (1937).
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requiring approval appeared in the second subdivision of the binder, while the
statement that the insurance would take effect immediately appeared in
the first. 62 The court then stated that there was no ambiguity in the case at bar
since the provision for immediate coverage and the condition of approval
appeared in the same sentence. 6 3 It is true that these two elements did appear
in the same sentence in the Corning case, but that one sentence was just as
lengthy and complicated as the corresponding two sentences in the Hart binder.
In addition, the continuity of the Corning binder was interrupted by an asterisk
which would draw14 the applicant's attention to an additional instruction at the
end of the receipt.
It would appear from the Corning case that the Appellate Division had
definitely changed its views on binding receipts after writing the Hart opinion.
The attempt to distinguish the latter case on such a nebulous ground would
seem to indicate that the court was merely showing its reluctance to expressly
or impliedly overrule itself. This reasoning could also apply to the affirmances
without opinion by the Court of Appeals in both cases. This speculation is
further strengthened by the fact that the Corning case was expressly followed
by the Arcuri and Hughes cases. The Hart case has never been followed because
the Buoni and Speronza cases, in which recovery was also allowed, are easily
distinguishable in that they involved the issue of waiver of the condition of approval by the company.
Perhaps the Hart case would be followed today if a case involving the identical
binder were litigated. The Court of Appeals would probably feel bound to write
an opinion stating the present law of the state. A strong opinion written by that
tribunal would do much to clarify one of the hazy points of insurance law, and
to render more certain the position of the parties involved in insurance contracts.
CONCLUSION

The soundest solution to the problem would be the passage of legislation
prohibiting the issuance of approval type binders, and requiring that a standardized form of satisfaction binder be used in all binding receipt transactions.
Then, if the applicant was in fact an insurable risk, a temporary contract of
insurance would come into existence, and would not be terminated until the company notified him that the application had been accepted or rejected. If an insurance company considered such statute adverse to its interests, it could avoid the
operation of the statute merely by refusing to issue a binding receipt, thus assuming the corresponding risk of having the applicant revoke his offer.
Elimination of the approval type binder would work to the advantage of both
the insurer and the insured. The applicant would be certain that he had coverage
at least until the company actually notified him of its rejection. The insurance
company, on the other hand, could cease to worry that the court would interpret
its actions as unconscionable, or the language of the binder as being ambiguous.
62. See note 51 supra.
63. Corning v. Prudential Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 187, 190, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661, 664
(2d Dep't 1936).
64. See note 50 supra.

